The iso-Score Curve Graph. A new tool for competitive bidding by Ballesteros-Pérez, Pablo et al.
The iso­Score Curve Graph. A new tool 
for competitive bidding 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Ballesteros­Pérez, P., González­Cruz, M. C., Pastor­Ferrando, 
J. P. and Fernández­Diego, M. (2012) The iso­Score Curve 
Graph. A new tool for competitive bidding. Automation in 
Construction, 22. pp. 481­490. ISSN 0926­5805 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.autcon.2011.11.007 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/51056/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
Published version at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.autcon.2011.11.007 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.autcon.2011.11.007 
Publisher: Elsevier 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
 2 
THE ISO-SCORE CURVE GRAPH. A NEW TOOL FOR COMPETITIVE BIDDING 
Authors: 
Ballesteros-Pérez, P a ; González-Cruz, Mª Carmen b ; 
Pastor-Ferrando, Juan Pascual c; Fernández-Diego, Marta d 
a Head of Construction studies in Depuración de Aguas del Mediterráneo SL (Spain).  
PhD. and Msc. in Civil engineering. 
Depuración de Aguas del Mediterráneo S.L. C/Guglielmo Marconi 11, 2nd, office 19 Parque 
Tecnológico 46980 Paterna (Valencia, Spain) 
Part-time Lecturer in Departamento de Ingeniería del Terreno. Escuela Técnica Superior de 
Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos. Universitat Politècnica de València. Cº de Vera s/n, 
46022 Valencia, Spain 
Phone: +34 902 881 510 (ext.: 366) Fax: +34 96 353 12 25.  
E-mail : pabbalpe@trr.upv.es 
 
 
b Lecturer in Departamento de Proyectos de Ingeniería. Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros 
Industriales. Universitat Politècnica de València. Cº de Vera s/n, 46022 Valencia, Spain 
PhD. Industrial Engineering. 
Phone: +34 963 879 866  (ext.:75654 ) Fax: +34 963 879 869 (ext.:79869 ). 
E-mail: mcgonzal@dpi.upv.es  
Corresponding author 
 
c Lecturer in Departamento de Proyectos de Ingeniería. Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros 
Industriales. Universitat Politècnica de València. Cº de Vera s/n, 46022 Valencia, Spain 
PhD. Industrial Engineering.  
Phone: +34 963 879 869  (ext.:75658 ) Fax: +34 963 879 869 (ext.:79869 ). 
E-mail: jppastor@dpi.upv.es 
 
c Lecturer in Departamento de Organización de Empresas. Facultad de Administración y Dirección de 
Empresas. Cº de Vera s/n, 46022 Valencia, Spain 
PhD. Telecommunications Engineering. 
Phone: +34 963 877 685 (ext.:76850 ) Fax: +34 963 879 779 (ext.:79779). 
E-mail: marferdi@omp.upv.es 
 
 3 
THE ISO-SCORE CURVE GRAPH. A NEW TOOL FOR COMPETITIVE 
BIDDING 
Abstract 
The present work describes a new tool that helps bidders improve their competitive bidding 
strategies. This new tool consists of an easy-to-use graphical tool that allows the use of 
more complex decision analysis tools in the field of Competitive Bidding. The graphic tool 
described here tries to move away from previous bidding models which attempt to describe 
the result of an auction or a tender process by means of studying each possible bidder with 
probability density functions. 
As an illustration, the tool is applied to three practical cases. Theoretical and practical 
conclusions on the great potential breadth of application of the tool are also presented.  
Keywords: bid, tender, auction, construction, score, graph. 
1. Introduction 
The volume of economic transactions conducted by competitive bidding gives importance 
both to the study of auctions as a part of basic research in economics and management 
science [1], and to the evaluation of assistance bidding practitioners can get from the 
advances made in auction theory [2]. Hence, research in the area of competitive bidding 
strategy models has been in progress since the 1950s [2-12]. 
The standard behavioral presumption of mainstream auction theory is that bidders: behave 
rationally, and presume that their rivals and the seller behave rationally [11]. 
Numerous competitive bidding strategy models have been developed that predict the 
probability of a bidder winning an auction [7, 8]. However there is no generally acceptable 
approach to solve real bidding problems, in particular the models based on the theory of 
Games, Decision Analysis and Operational Research are difficult to apply to real-world 
business contexts largely because of the complex mathematical formulations used in the 
models and/or because the models do not suit the actual practices [2, 8, 11]. 
Because of the complexity in the application of such models to public tenders [2, 7, 8, 11, 13 
-16], where multiple technical and financial criteria are involved, there is still a need for the 
development of new tools that help decision makers and improve the selection process of 
candidate contractors in any kind of public tender, thus extending their field of application to 
tender contests. 
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The present work presents a new practical tool that can help potential bidders improve their 
competitive bidding strategies and increase their chances of winning a contract. This tool 
constitutes a new graph that aims to enable bidders to place their bids thanks to previous 
bidding experiences and according to simple statistical procedures. 
2. Main previous works 
A great body of knowledge exists on the theory of auctions and competitive bidding that is of 
potential relevance to construction contract tendering. Most of this, however, contains 
assumptions—such as perfect information—that are unlikely to be tenable in practice [19]. 
The large literature on bidding theory and models (see Stark and Rothkopf, 1979, [20] for an 
early bibliography) is replete with what can be termed ‘the statistical hypothesis’ in that 
auction bids are assumed to contain statistical properties such as fixed parameters and 
randomness [16]. 
The first contributions (e.g., Friedman, 1956 [21]) assumed that each bidder drew bids from 
a probability distribution unique to that bidder, with low-frequency bidders being pooled as a 
special case. 
Pim (1974) [22] analysed a number of projects awarded to four USA construction 
companies. His study indicated that the average number of projects acquired is generally 
proportional to the reciprocal of the average number of bidders competing - the proportion 
that would be expected to be won by pure 'chance' alone. That suggested an extremely 
simple ‘equal probability’ model in which the expected probability of entering the lowest bid 
in a k-size auction, that is, an auction in which k bidders enter bids, is the reciprocal of k. 
Later work by McCaffer and Pettitt (1976) [23] and Mitchell (1977) [24] for example, 
assumed the probability distributions to be non-unique and homogeneous, enabling a 
suitable distribution shape to be empirically fitted (uniform, in the case of McCaffer and 
Pettitt) and the derivation of order statistics based on an assumed (normal) density function. 
Since then, most of the bidding literature has been concerned with setting a mark-up, m, so 
that the probability, Pr(m), of entering the winning bid reaches some desired level. Several 
models have been proposed for calculating Pr(m) [25], among them, four main approaches 
have been: Friedman’s [21], Gates’ [26], Carr’s [27] and Skitmore’s [28] models.  
All these models are based on the same statistical model but differ in their detailed 
assumptions of its specification. Nevertheless, previous work in auction bidding has to a 
large extent been carried out without any real supporting data. In fact, in the context of 
construction contract auction bidding, it has been doubtful that sufficient data can be 
mustered for each bidder for any effective predictions to be made [16]. 
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By means of analysing some real and typical sets of auction bid data it has been possible to 
compare the aforementioned major models against pure chance and each other, showing 
that all offer an improvement on chance with multivariate models generally giving the best 
results [16].  
Later empirical work by Skitmore (1991) [28] showed the homogeneity assumption to be 
untenable for real datasets of construction contract auctions, at least insofar as its superiority 
in predicting the probability of lowest bidders is concerned (Skitmore, 1999) [16]. Runeson 
and Skitmore (1999) [29], however, have cast doubt on the whole future of the 
heterogeneous approach to modelling construction contract auction bids on the basis of its 
necessary, but forced, assumption of temporal invariance (fixed parameters) in the absence 
of the lengthy repeated trials assumed by the statistical model – each bidder not bidding 
frequently enough to generate a reasonable size dataset. 
The benefits of using these models in practice are, however, like the models themselves, 
statistical in nature. Like professional gamblers, proficient bidders given even a slight edge 
over chance should be able to exploit this to advantage over a period of time [16]. 
The graphic tool described later will enable bidders representing bidding historical data and 
inferring patterns of competitors’ behavior in a way not studied before. Whereas previous 
models are mainly based on probabilistic description of groups of single bidders, the new bid 
tender forecasting model (BTFM hereinafter), whose first part is constituted by the graphical 
tool described afterwards, will describe group patterns while bidding. 
This alternative viewpoint will allow us: (1) to study bidding behaviors with a significant small 
database compared to previous works; (2) to forecast the probability of getting a particular 
position within the group of competitors, and (3) to analyse time variations between tenders. 
The advantages of the new model we are going to explain solve the major problems that 
almost all of the previous models currently have. 
However, due to the lack of space needed to show the whole BTFM, in this paper only the 
first model’s tool will be shown: the iso-Score Curves Graph, which enables us to represent, 
on a convenient canvas, the bidding data and statistical functions that will be explained in 
upcoming articles. 
Finally, apart from BTFMs described above, formal and analytical risk models have been 
developed in order to prescribe how risk should be incorporated into construction bids, 
however, in real practice, priced risks may be excluded from the final bid to enhance 
competitiveness [30]. 
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Although risk apportionment affects a contractor’s pricing strategy, other complex 
microeconomic factors also affect price. Therefore some other recent but lighter conceptual 
models have been developed for use by contractors as part of a more informed approach in 
identifying key competitors, and as a basis for formulating bidding strategies [31]. The 
competitiveness between bids is then examined by means of linear mixed models according 
to variables such as: project type and size, work sector; work nature; market conditions and 
number of bidders [32]. The BTFM proposed in the future will not involve risk issues, so this 
kind of model will be a useful complement to the proposed one. 
3. Background. Auctions vs Tenders 
In general there are many different forms of auctions and several useful ways of cIassifying 
these variants. A "standard" auction means one in which the winner is the highest bidder 
among potential buyers, or the lowest bidder among potential sellers. The distinction 
between contexts in which bidders are competing to buy and to sell is relatively unimportant: 
there is an almost perfect correspondence in results. In what follows, we will normally not 
comment further on the difference between bidding to buy and bidding to sell [2]. 
Most bidding theory papers discuss a single isolated auction of a single indivisible asset. The 
most common exception is papers discussing an isolated sale, usually simuItaneous but 
perhaps sequential, of a fixed number of identical assets to bidders, each of whom attach no 
value to a second purchase; these are typically called "multiunit" auctions [33, 34]. Parallels 
to single-asset auctions exist, but are incomplete. 
Auctions can be either "open" or "closed." In open auctions, prices are publicly announced 
and bidders can indicate their willingness to transact at the particular prices. In closed 
auctions, bidders submit offers simultaneously, and these offers are then evaluated by the 
bid-taker. 
Open auctions can be "progressive" as in the familiar "English auction" in which the 
auctioneer solicits successively better offers until no bidder is willing make a better bid. 
Alternatively, they can be "Dutch auctions" where the auctioneer (or now an electronic 
device) announces successively lower prices until a bidder bids and thereby wins the right to 
the lot for sale. 
By far the most common closed auction form is standard sealed bidding. However, there is 
an alternate form that is used only occasionally. It was proposed by Vickrey (1961) [34] in a 
partially successful attempt to devise a closed procedure strategically equivalent to the 
English auction. In such "Vickrey auctions" of single items, the winning bidder is the one who 
submitted the best bid, but the price is set at the level of the second-best bid [34]. 
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Thus, it is called a "second-price auction" in contrast to standard sealed bidding and Dutch 
auctions which are called "first-price auctions" since the winner's price is the best price 
offered. English auctions are considered second-price auctions, because the transaction 
price is at the level of (or marginally better than) the best price acceptable to any losing 
bidder. Multiunit analogues are "discriminatory" auctions (each winner pays the price he bid) 
and "highest-rejected-bid" auctions [35]. 
On the other hand, the low-bid method may result in a contract with a firm that submits either 
accidentally or deliberately an unrealistically low-bid price. Such an occurrence hurts both 
the owner and the contractor by promoting disputes, increased costs, and schedule delays. 
To address this problem, other countries have adopted bidding methods based on the 
average of the bids submitted. One such approach is the below-average method where the 
winning bid is closest to but below the average of all bids [36]. 
Finally, auctions also blend into request-for-proposal processes. Some such processes are 
essentially auctions. In others the rules for evaluating proposals are not well understood by 
the bidders, and the proposals may be the first step in a relatively unstructured negotiation 
process [2]. 
McAfee and McMillan (1987) [37], Wilson (1992) [38], and Klemperer (1999) [39] provide 
surveys of auction theory; Stark and Rothkopf (1979) [20] attempt a comprehensive 
bibliography; Krishna (2002) [40] gives some degree of literature survey in a book intended 
for a graduate course; and Klemperer (2004) [41] and Milgrom (2004) [42] include literature 
surveys aimed at somewhat broader audiences. 
However, many studies in the literature are concerned with the analysis of bidding behavior 
of contractors in auctions but not in tender contests [6- 9, 13, 25, 28, 43]. In tenders, the 
contract is awarded depending on a number of technical and financial criteria. Auctions can 
be considered a simple type of tender as the contract is awarded using a single criterion: the 
economic one [8, 16, 44] no matter how this criterion is implemented: English or Dutch 
auction, Open or Closed auction, Sealed-bid or Vickrey auction. The economic criterion most 
widely used in both processes (auctions and tender contests) is that of “the economically 
most advantageous bid” [45], the difference being that auctions rely exclusively on the 
economic criterion whereas tender contests use several technical and financial criteria. In 
tender contests, the economic criterion is weighted, just like any of the other criteria used in 
the process [46]. 
Many recent studies that develop ranking models for the unbiased prioritization of bidders [2, 
8, 46-51] are based on multi-criteria decision analysis models [52-56] in detriment of the use 
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of weighted financial factors. Even more recently some models facilitate and optimize the 
procedures of bidding by means of electronic systems [55, 57]. 
However, the tool proposed later and the whole bid tender forecasting model (BTFM), that 
will be eventually explained, is not linked to any previous multi-criteria decision method, 
indeed it is not a multi-criteria tool. The aim of the BTFM is exclusively to represent the 
probability that each economic bid has of obtaining a particular score, position or, even, 
being considered risky by the owner. No other criteria will be involved but the economic one. 
In other words, whereas multi-criteria tools are usually applied to rank and weight several 
tender items (normally technical, administrative and economical items) but only as a whole, 
the BTFM will study the economic criterion in depth, trying to identify which range of potential 
bids have higher probabilities to win. 
Returning to the difference between auctions and tenders, the procedure to award a contract 
is different in either contest case: 
1. In auctions, the winner will be the bidder with the economically most advantageous 
and non-abnormally low bid among candidate bidders. Therefore, the key issue in 
auctions is the final ranking of bidders. There is no need to assign an economic score 
to each bidder since the cheapest one will be the winner, though the bidder will not 
necessarily be awarded the contract with the lowest bid (e. g. Vickrey auctions). 
2. In tender contests, the winner will be the best-scored bidder ranked according to a 
scoring system (known in advance and specified in the tender conditions, which 
usually includes administrative, technical and economic issues). For example, the 
performance of every economic proposal is rated for each evaluation factor 
(Maximum Bid, Average Bid, and so on) and generally, although not always, those 
proposals which deviate from the average are eliminated. 
Therefore, the qualitative difference between auctions and tender contests, from an 
economic perspective, is a more complex issue as the contestants’ bids have to be “scored” 
(rather than “ranked”). 
The criterion of economic scoring in public tender is a key issue since the score obtained will 
be further aggregated to the values obtained in the technical and financial criteria thus 
generating the final rank of bidders. In other words, the particular Economic Scoring Formula 
chosen by the owner to distribute the total amount of points, by which the economic part of 
the tender is being evaluated, is not trivial. This ranking will determine the most suitable 
bidders for contract award and, possibly, different Economic Scoring Formulas will lead to 
different bidder rankings. 
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The scores assigned to the technical factors and bid price of the proposals participating in a 
bidding process depend on the following two factors [46, 58, 59]: 
 The relative weights (weighing) of the technical factors against the financial factors 
for each particular bid situation. It is not the same that in a tender the economic part 
involves only 35% (for instance) of the complete scoring factors, but that the 
economic element equals 100% (an auction, not a tender, as we have defined). 
Probably, the behavior of bidders will show different scales of economic 
aggressiveness. 
 The mathematical model used to compare the bidders’ bids for the technical and 
financial factors under consideration (Economic Scoring Formulas).  
The main reason why multi-criteria decision models have been extensively used for ranking 
bidders is because subsequent sensitivity analyses have demonstrated that the final bidders’ 
ranking greatly differs depending on the criteria and weights used in the evaluation process 
[46, 50]. But, as was previously said, the proposed tool focuses on the study of economic 
probabilities getting a certain economic score, obviating other tender items. 
4. Basic definitions  
Public Administrations in different countries use different terms to refer to the same tender 
concepts. Additionally, some terms used in this paper do not match the standards of the 
Spanish Public Administration. Therefore, for clarity we will define some of the terms used in 
this work: 
“Economic Scoring Formula” (ESF) is the set of mathematical expressions that are used to 
assign a certain numerical value to each bidder from his/her bid price expressed on a 
monetary-unit basis. ESF includes the mathematical operations that provide the score and 
the mathematical formula that determines which bids are considered abnormal or risky 
(Abnormally Low Bids Criteria (ALBC). ALBC has received much less attention in the 
literature than the analysis of contractor’s bidding behavior [60]. 
“Scoring Parameter”(SP). SP refers to the variables that allow ESF to be operational. They 
are calculated from the distribution of the bids participating in a tender contest. 
“Bidder Drop (D). It is the discount or bid reduction in the initial price of a contract submitted 
by a given contractor for a particular contest. It is mathematically expressed as: 
 
A
B1D ii   (1) 
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Where Di is the Drop (expressed in per-unit values) of bidder “i”, Bi is the Bid (expressed in 
monetary values) of bidder “i”, and A is the initial Amount of money (in monetary values) of 
the Tender (generally set by the Public Administration). 
ESF scores result from the input of the bidders’ bids (Bi) (in monetary values) or through the 
transformation of bidders’ bids into Drops (Di) (in per-unit values). Both options have 
advantages, but for the comparison of bids in different bidding processes, with different initial 
bid amounts (A), it will be better to work with Drops (Di) than with Monetary-based Bids (Bi). 
5. Fieldwork 
In order to have a number of representative ESF from different bidding processes for further 
analysis and SP ranking, a total of 120 real tender documents of Spanish Public 
Administrations and private companies were collected. 
The dataset collected and analyzed is sufficiently representative as it comprises: Tender 
contests and Auctions, all kinds of public administrations (City Councils, local councils, semi-
public entities, universities, ministries, and so on), a great variety of civil engineering works 
and services, representation of different geographical regions (including the islands) and a 
wide range of Tender Amounts. Although the sample only contains Spanish tender 
documents, the ESF and SP analyzed are common to those used in any country where the 
Administration sets an initial Tender Amount (A) against which candidates will underbid. 
The specification of an initial Tender Amount A allows the use of Bid Drops as the Drop 
indicates a discount or bid reduction in the price relative to a fixed initial Amount A. The tool 
presented in this paper works well with both Tender Amounts and Bid Drops. The examples 
presented here have been calculated using Bid Drops expressed in per-unit values. 
6. Scoring Parameters Classification 
The Economic Scoring Formulas of the 120 contract documents have been calculated and 
the corresponding SP have been classified into two groups: Primary SP and Secondary SP. 
The Primary SP are base line or reference parameters from which the Secondary SP are 
calculated. 
The Primary SP are:  
 Mean Drop, “Dm”; It is the mean value of the Bid Drops submitted by the total number 
of bidders admitted in a particular tender contest. The relation with the Mean Bid (Bm) 
in monetary values is:  AD1B mm   
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 Maximum Drop, “Dmax”; it is the per-unit Drop corresponding to the Minimum Bid 
submitted by the bidders. Its relation with the Minimum Bid (Bmin) in monetary value 
is:  AD1B maxmin  . 
 Minimum Drop, “Dmin”; it is the per-unit Drop corresponding to the Maximum Bid 
submitted by the bidders. Its relation with the Maximum Bid (Bmax) in monetary value 
is:  AD1B minmax  . 
 Drops’ Standard Deviation, (Drops’ stdev), “σ”; in certain project-level-of-risk criteria it 
is typical to express bid rates on a percent basis relative to the Standard deviation 
values of the bids. Its relation with Bids’ Standard Deviation (S) (Bids’ stdev) in 
monetary value is: A·σS  . 
The second group of SP consists of the Secondary SP. As mentioned above, they result 
from the calculation of one or more primary SP. The Secondary SP are: 
 Abnormal Drop “Dabn” is the Drop Threshold value; bids below this threshold value 
will be considered abnormal or risky. The Abnormal Drop is calculated with a formula 
that includes some primary SP such as Dm (for example, a certain percentage value 
lower than the Mean Drop). Its relation with Abnormal Bid (Babn) in monetary value is: 
 AD1B abnabn  ; when Dabn is calculated as a distance from average T (in per-
unit values) relative to Dm, the expression is:   mabn D1T11D  . 
 Corrected Mean Drop, “DmC”; it consists of an adapted Dm, usually obtained after 
rejecting extremely high/low bids or bids included within a certain range of margin, 
e.g. Dm±σ.  
 Allowable Maximum Drop, “Dmax*”; is the maximum non-risk or abnormal bid drop. 
 Complex Parameters. ESF may require the use of parameters calculated from one or 
several primary SP with different mathematical criteria. Through a single 
mathematical expression that operates with “Absolute Values” over certain primary 
SP, Complex Parameters allow the generation of a new curve that represents very 
different scoring intervals. It is used for very unusual ESF and SP. 
Primary and Secondary SP are combined mathematically to generate specific ESF for each 
particular bid situation and should be clearly specified in the contract conditions of the 
tender.  
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7. The iso-Score Curve Graph 
The iso-Score Curve “iSC” is defined as the geometrical region of points associated with the 
bids submitted by a bidder and scored with the same number of points according to a known 
ESF. 
An iso-Score Curve Graph “iSCG” is a 2D graphical representation with the following 
features: 
 It represents an ESF Score Parameter on axis X 
 It represents Bidders’ Drop (Di) on axis Y  
 It represents the iso-score curves of the ESF at predefined scoring intervals (Si)  
Iso-score curves can represent score values; for example, for an ESF that distributes up to 
50 points among the bidders, we can obtain 50-point, 45-point, 40-point curves … up to the 
0-point curve. Additionally, iso-score curves can also represent a value-scale in per-unit 
values; in our example, the 1-iso-score curve corresponds to the 50-point curve, the 0.90-
iso-score curve to the 45-point curve, the 0.80-iso-score curve to the 40-point curve, and so 
on. 
The use of per-unit curves is much more advisable as their value is independent of the 
weighing of the financial factors relative to the technical factors. 
The procedure to generate iso-Score Curves from the ESF is as follows: 
1. Express mathematically the Economic Scoring formula.  
2. Convert the ESF (when expressed in monetary units) into Drops (with parameters 
expressed in per-unit values). 
3. Express the ESF in terms of a single Score Parameter, SP, (when the ESF contains 
more than one SP) for the 2D representation of the parameters. 
4. Calculate variable Di (Bidders’ Drop) from the expression of the ESF obtained in the 
previous step. 
5. Represent the different iSC graphically for the required and/or selected score values 
(Si). 
Following, this procedure is applied to three case studies for the generation of iSCG. We 
have developed three case studies so as to cover the most typical ESF found in Spanish 
tender contests, in terms of SP and abnormal or project-risk criteria. 
Based on the information provided by the representation of the iSCG of these three ESF, the 
iSCG of other less typical ESF can be obtained. 
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The procedure to obtain these iSCG follows the 5 steps described above. In order to simplify 
the text, the equations for each step will be included in the appendix, starting from the 
second step. 
7.1. Mathematical expression of the ESF 
The mathematical expression of the ESF should be specified by the Public Administration or 
the owner in the contract documents of the tender; however sometimes it is expressed in 
linguistic terms rather than numerically. In such a case, the first step will be to express the 
ESF mathematically.  
Case 1: 
The ESF is represented by the following mathematical expressions: 
 ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§  
min
mini
i B
BB150S   and    mabn BT1B   (A1.1) 
Where: 
Si = Score of bidder “i”. Assume that, according to the contract conditions of the tender 
contest, bidders can get scores between 0 and 50 points (0< Si < 50). For the expression of 
the score in per-unit values, value 50 will be replaced by 1. 
Bi : Bid price in monetary value of bidder “i” for the execution of the contract 
Bmin : The lowest allowable bid (but not abnormally low bid), i.e. Bmin>Babn, proposed by the 
bidders.  
Babn : Bid Price in monetary value below which the bid is considered abnormally low. 
T: Abnormally High Drop Threshold. For the case study under consideration the documents 
of the tender contest set a value of 10% (0.10). 
Bm: Mean value of the bids in monetary value. 
Case 2: 
 
min
i
i BA
BA35S 
   and  S2BB mabn   (A2.1) 
Where: 
A is the initial contract price (tender Amount) in monetary value (set by the Administration). 
Si : Score of bidder “i” . Assume that, according to the tender conditions, bidders can get 
scores between 0 and 35 points (0< Si < 35). For the expression of the score in per-unit 
values, value 35 will be replaced by 1. 
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S : Standard deviation of the bids in monetary value.  
Bi, Bmin, Babn and Bm are the same parameters as those used in Case 1.  
Case 3: 
 
minm
mini
i BB
BB1040S 
   and   AT1Babn   (A3.1) 
Where all variables have been described in the case studies above. Let Si (according to 
some hypothetical tender conditions) be between 0 and 40 points (0< Si < 40). For the 
expression of the score in per-unit values, value 40 will be replaced by 1 and value 10 by 
0.25. 
Assume that in this example the tender document sets the Abnormally High Drop Threshold 
(T) to 30% (0.30). 
7.2. Transformation of the ESF into Drops 
This step is required when ESF is not expressed in per-unit Drops but in monetary values. 
The necessary expressions for the transformation of ESF into Drops are: 
  AD1B maxmin  ;    AD1B minmax  ;    AD1B mm  ; (2, 3, 4) 
  AD1B abnabn  ;   A·σS   (5, 6) 
Basically it comes down to a matter of changing Bx variables for Dx variables, with x equals 
m, min, max or abn. 
The expressions of the three cases in per-unit Drops, assuming that Si is also expressed in 
per-unit values, are shown in the appendix for: Case 1 (equation A1.2), Case 2 (equation 
A2.2) and Case 3 (equation A3.2). 
7.3. Expressing ESF in terms of a single Scoring Parameter 
Taking into account that the iSCG puts in the X-axis an SP, the ESF must be expressed in 
function of a single SP, otherwise it is impossible to represent a 2D graph. 
Any parameter can be used to express ESF, but it is better to use a parameter already 
expressed mathematically (e.g. Dm and/or Dmax). 
For the transformation of a multi-parameter ESF into a single-parameter ESF it is necessary 
to know the following proposed primary relations between scoring parameters: 
 ammax DD  ;   bmmin DD  ;    minmax DDKσ   (7, 8, 9) 
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These relations were obtained from the analysis of the 120 contract documents of Spanish 
Public Administrations and Private Companies. Note that Dm, Dmin and Dmax are correlation 
curves that cross points (0,0) and (1,1), whereas the fitting curve of σ always crosses (0,0) 
and (1,0). 
In addition, the correlation between variables depends on random coefficients (a, b and K). 
These coefficients are obtained from any recent record data belonging to the same 
Administration and using the same ESF. 
After the identification of the correlation curves that best correlate the scoring parameters, 
the expressions of the case studies are shown in the appendix: Case 1 (equations A1.3a 
and A1.3b), Case 2 (equations A2.3a and A2.3b) and Case 3 (equations A3.3a and A3.3b). 
Note that a, b, K and T are coefficients of known value whose numerical determination is 
necessary for the representation of the iso-Score Curves. 
7.4. Calculate variable Di from the ESF 
Starting from the expressions calculated in the previous step, it is a matter of working out the 
value of Di and Dabn. The following results are obtained for each case study in the appendix: 
Case 1 (equations A1.4a and A1.4b), Case 2 (equations A2.4a and A2.4b) and Case 3 
(equations A3.4a and A3.4b). 
When seeing step 4’s equations note that it was not necessary to perform additional 
transformations over the expressions of Dabn since Dabn is actually a curve ready to be 
represented once the values of Dm or Dmax are known. 
7.5. Plotting the iso-Score Curves 
Finally, variable Si has to be equalled to the values whose score is to be represented. In the 
cases under analysis, the following values were selected: 1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 
0.2, 0.1 and 0. 
To facilitate the obtaining of numerical values the following generic values were assigned: 
a=0.85, b=1.50 and K=0.30 (the numerical values should be obtained from the analysis of 
the databases of each public administration for a given ESF, as aforementioned) and the 
values of T mentioned above (T=0.10 in Case 1 and T=0.30 in Case 3). 
From the data and representation of these 11 curves plus the Dabn curve for each case under 
analysis, we obtain the following graphs whose numerical data are shown in the appendix: 
Case 1 (Table 1), Case 2 (Table 2) and Case 3 (Table 3). 
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Case 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Dm
Di
1.00 0.90 0.80
0.70 0.60 0.50
0.40 0.30 0.20
0.10 0.00 Dabn
Figure1.1: iso-Score Curve Graph of Case 1 for the Mean Drop (Dm)  
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Dmax
Di
1.00 0.90 0.80
0.70 0.60 0.50
0.40 0.30 0.20
0.10 0.00 Dabn
Figure 1.2: iso-Score Curve Graph of Case 1 for the Maximum Drop (Dmax) 
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Case 2: 
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 Figure 2.1: iso-Score Curve Graph of Case 2 for the Mean Drop (Dm)  
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 Figure 2.2: iso-Score Curve Graph of Case 2 for the Maximum Drop (Dmax) 
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Case 3: 
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 Figure 3.1: iso-Score Curve Graph of Case 3 for the Mean Drop (Dm) 
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7.6. Interpretation of the iSCG 
The iSCG allows the visual observation of the distribution of points for a given ESF in a 
simple way. The analysis of the graphs obtained in the examples reveals that: 
Case 1: 
Competitive bids lie within the range [Dm, Dmax-0,05]; within this range the score values will 
always be higher than 90%. 
It seems difficult to be eliminated by the criterion of abnormally low bid for Dm intervals 
higher than 0.35 (which corresponds to relatively higher Di bids). 
Case 2: 
Zero Drop bids should not be presented as the bidder would receive 0 points; additionally 
the total score significantly drops as the distance from Dmax increases. 
In the Dm range [0.30, 0.70] it seems difficult to surpass the Abnormally Low Bid Threshold, 
which corresponds to the Dmax range [0.36, 0.74] (a wide range). 
It is convenient to set the bid price within the range 0.9·Dmax and 1.2·Dmax, as within this 
range there are high expectations of being well rated and low probability of being abnormally 
low. 
Case 3: 
As in the case above, Zero Drop bids should not be presented to avoid zero scores, and in 
this case, Di should never exceed 0.30. 
The probability of getting very low scores for bids below Dmax is very high and the risk to 
exceed the abnormally low bid threshold for drops lower than 0.30 is zero, so that bidders 
should set their Di close to 0.30 even if substantially sacrificing their estimated profit.  
Bidders should try to surpass the Dmax, so that the bid should lie between Dmax and T (equal 
to 0.30). 
8. Conclusions 
Since it should be kept in mind that sometimes understanding how the Economic Scoring 
Formula (ESF) in a tender operates is not evident from direct observation of the 
mathematical expression, iSCGs allow the visual observation of any financial scoring 
criterion in a simple and graphical form. 
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Once the decision maker is trained on its use, the method allows finding aspects of the ESF 
that can help bidders to set their bids within more advantageous bid margins. On the other 
hand, also Public Administration might predict bids that are going to receive and integrate 
them in its own information systems or even decide which ESF should be more suitable for 
its own tender purposes or aims. 
An additional advantage of the use of iSCG is that they allow the representation of tender 
datasets and greatly help to adjust the regression curves (to determine the values of 
coefficients a, b and K among others) that will allow a bidder to predict the bids of his/her 
competitors in future bidding processes. Related to the previous thing, the technologies of 
the data mining are very useful for the extraction of information of biddings [61] 
9. Discussion. Limitations of the iSCG and Future work 
The iso-Score Curves Graph (iSCG) by itself is only able to represent how a particular ESF 
distributes the economic points in a certain tender and to identify the relationships between 
the main Scoring Parameters involved. Finally, it also enables us to know what Bid values 
will be rejected for being abnormally low or risky. 
Nevertheless, in order to constitute a complete Bid Tender Forecasting Model (BTFM) the 
iSCG must be complemented with further tools and graphs. 
In subsequent research it will be shown which are the general mathematical relationships 
between the main Scoring Parameters and what probabilistic density functions are those 
which represent their plausible variation values. It will also introduce new Parameters that 
can be known in advance, that is before the deadline of a tender, that will allow bidders to 
make bid forecasting; otherwise, it would be impossible to make any kind of predictions. 
Once these relationships and parameters have been presented, iso-Score Curves will be 
used again to generate new types of graphs useful for making predictions. 
The nature of information that will enable the whole BTFM outlined in advance aims to be 
useful to both bidders and owners to predict what different bidding scenarios should be 
expected once tender specifications have been laid down. 
Appendix 
Main abbreviations used in the text: 
A  Amount of money of a Tender  
a  regression coefficient to adjust relationship between Dmax and Dm 
ALB Abnormally Low Bid 
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ALBC Abnormally Low Bids Criteria 
B  Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
b  regression coefficient to adjust relationship between Dmin and Dm 
Bi  Bidder’s I Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
Babn Abnormal Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
Bm  Mean Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
Bmax Highest Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
Bmin Lowest Bid (expressed in monetary value) 
BTFM Bid Tender Forecasting Model 
D  Drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dabn Abnormal Drop 
Di  Bidder’s i Drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dm  Mean Drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dmax Maximum Drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dmax* Maximum Allowable Drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
DmC Corrected Mean Drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
Dmin Minimum Drop (expressed in per-unit value) 
ESF Economic Scoring Formula 
iSC iso-Score Curve 
iSCG iso-Score Graph 
K  regression coefficient to adjust relationship between σ and either Dmax and Dmin 
S  Bids’ Standard Deviation 
Si  Score of the bidder i (can be expressed either in points or in per-unit value) 
SP  Scoring Parameter 
T  Abnormally High Drop Threshold 
σ  Drops’ Standard Deviation 
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Main relationships between variables stated in the text: 
 AD1B mm   
 AD1B maxmin   
 AD1B minmax   
 AD1B abnabn   
A
B1D ii   
a
mmax DD   
b
mmin DD   
  mabn D1T11D   
 minmax DDKσ   
A·σS   
 
Equations of iSCGs’ Calculation steps for the three cases: 
Case 1 
1) ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§  
min
mini
i B
BB150S   and    mabn BT1B           (A1.1) 
2) 
max
imax
i D1
DD1S 
   and    mabn D1T11D          (A1.2) 
3)  
max
imax
maxi D1
DD1DfS 
    and     
¹¸
·
©¨
§   a
1
mmaxabn D1T11DfD    (A1.3a) 
   a
a
m
im
mi D1
DD1DfS

    and      mmabn D1T11DfD       (A1.3b) 
4)     maximaxmaxi D1S1DDfD    and     ¹¸
·
©¨
§   a
1
mmaxabn D1T11DfD
(A1.4a) 
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aa mimmi D1S1DDfD     and      mmabn D1T11DfD    (A1.4b) 
5) Table 1: Numerical values of the iso-Score Curves of Case 1 
 
Case 2 
1) 
min
i
i BA
BA35S 
   and  S2BB mabn             (A2.1) 
2) 
max
i
i D
DS    and  σ2DD mabn               (A2.2) 
3)  
max
i
maxi D
DDfS     and    ¸
¹
·¨
©
§   a
b
a maxmax
1
mmaxabn DDK2DDfD    (A2.3a) 
   a
m
i
mi D
DDfS     and     ba maxmmmabn DDK2DDfD        (A2.3b) 
4)    maximaxi D·SDfD     and    ¸¹
·¨
©
§   a
b
a maxmax
1
mmaxabn DDK2DDfD  (A2.4a) 
    amimi D·SDfD     and     ba maxmmmabn DDK2DDfD      (A2.4b) 
5) Table 2: Numerical values of the iso-Score Curves of Case 2 
 
Dmax*
min(Dmax,Dabn) 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.20 -0.30 -0.40 -0.50 -0.60 -0.70 -0.80 -0.90 -1.00
0.10 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.06 -0.03 -0.12 -0.20 -0.29 -0.37 -0.46 -0.55 -0.63 -0.72
0.20 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.11 0.03 -0.04 -0.12 -0.19 -0.27 -0.34 -0.42 -0.49
0.30 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.30 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.04 -0.02 -0.09 -0.15 -0.22 -0.28
0.40 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.24 0.19 0.13 0.08 0.03 -0.03 -0.08
0.50 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.51 0.46 0.42 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.10
0.60 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.46 0.42 0.39 0.35 0.32 0.28
0.70 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.68 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.46
0.80 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.64
0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.82
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Dm Si (iso-Scoring Curves)Dmax Dabn
 
Table 1: Numerical values of the iso-Score Curves of Case 1 
Dmax*
min(Dmax,Dabn) 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.10 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00
0.20 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.00
0.30 0.36 0.42 0.36 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.00
0.40 0.46 0.52 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.00
0.50 0.55 0.62 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.44 0.39 0.33 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.00
0.60 0.65 0.71 0.65 0.65 0.58 0.52 0.45 0.39 0.32 0.26 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.00
0.70 0.74 0.79 0.74 0.74 0.66 0.59 0.52 0.44 0.37 0.30 0.22 0.15 0.07 0.00
0.80 0.83 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.74 0.66 0.58 0.50 0.41 0.33 0.25 0.17 0.08 0.00
0.90 0.91 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.82 0.73 0.64 0.55 0.46 0.37 0.27 0.18 0.09 0.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00
Dm Dmax Si (iso-Scoring Curves)Dabn
 
Table 2: Numerical values of the iso-Score Curves of Case 2 
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Case 3 
1) 
minm
mini
i BB
BB1040S 
   and   AT1Babn            (A3.1) 
2) 
mmax
imax
i DD
DD25.01S 
   and  TDabn             (A3.2) 
3)  
a
1
maxmax
imax
maxi
DD
DD25.01DfS

    and    TDfD maxabn        (A3.3a) 
  
mm
im
mi DD
DD25.01DfS a
a

    and    TDfD mabn        (A3.3b) 
4)    
¹¸
·
©¨
§   a
1
maxmaximaxmaxi DDS14DDfD   and    TDfD maxabn     (A3.4a) 
     mmimmi DDS14DDfD aa     and    TDfD mabn        (A3.4b) 
5) Table 3: Numerical values of the iso-Score Curves of Case 3 
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